Guilt by Association: Contrasting views on the fairness of ‘secret trials’ of ‘terrorists’ by Campbell, John R
This is the accepted manuscript of a chapter published by Brill in Terrorism and Asylum 
 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/31317/  
 
Guilt by Association:  
Contrasting views on the fairness of ‘secret trials’ of ‘terrorists’1 
 
 
Dr. John R Campbell 
Department of Anthropology & Sociology 





This chapter examines key aspects of procedural justice which arise when individuals 
are detained under counter-terrorist legislation in the United Kingdom. The task 
requires a careful look at the legal proceedings which individuals who are detained 
under control orders/TPIMs are subject to, namely a ‘secret trial’ and their 
dependence on the work of Special Advocates to disclose/reveal the Home Office case 
against them and judges whose scope in deciding appeals is extremely limited. An 
examination of the procedural measures adopted in these cases reveals the very 
different way that secret trials operate to that of public criminal trials. At the same 
time, and by contrast with anthropology, I argue that the disciplinary training of 
lawyers predisposes them to accept a narrow approach to ‘facts’ and a tendency to 
assign liability for actions in ways which facilitate secret legal processes. In contrast 
anthropologists, in their attempt to see the work of law more holistically, seek to 
probe, unsettle and question the apparent certainties which underlay legal practice 
and to ask whether such procedures are fair and just.  
 
Key words: anthropology, law, control orders/TPIM, Closed Material Proceedings, 
guilt by association. 
 
John Rawls’2sparked considerable interest in procedural and natural justice which has 
been taken up by legal scholars and practicing lawyers and jurists but has not been 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to John Jackson and Graham Hudson for their detailed comments on an 
earlier version of this paper which has been presented and discussed at various 
conferences and seminars. I would also like to thank James Simeon for his detailed 
comments on the chapter. 




explored comparatively or ethnographically by anthropologists. Laura Nader3, a legal 
anthropologist, has argued that taken for granted phrases such as ‘the rule of law’ 
conceal more than they reveal and that anthropologists should question normative 
assumptions to understand the way that the law may be experienced as a form of 
‘injustice’. Anthropologists have long recognized that the disciplinary training of 
lawyers and anthropologists imbues each profession with distinctive paradigms and 
assumptions.4Anthropological research has examined the way that lawyers are 
trained to think5, the very different ways that lawyers/judges and anthropologists 
approach ‘facts’,6 the disjuncture between lawyer and litigant assumptions of 
fairness7 and the importance of different ‘styles of speaking’ in court8 among other 
things.   
I draw on this literature to examine legal practices and procedures which I 
observed during the ‘secret trial’ of a suspected terrorist in which I was instructed as 
a ‘country expert’. By carefully examining legal practice and procedure I examine 
how lawyers locate liability and arrive at a judgment – guilty or not guilty – in ways 
that sharply contrast with anthropological methods and training which require one to 
suspend belief to search for an explanation. In short, I contrast the normative, 
judgmental approach taken by law with the anthropological requirement of situating a 
                                                 
3 Laura Nader, ‘The words we use: justice, human rights, and the sense of injustice’, 
in K. Clarke & M. Goodale. Eds. Mirrors of Justice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press: N.Y. 2010), 316-331. 
4 Kandel, R. ‘How lawyers and anthropologists think differently’, Annals of 
Anthropological Practice (1992), 1-20. 
5 J. Conley, ‘Review: Can You Talk like a Lawyer and Still Think like a Human 
Being? Mertz's the Language of Law School’, Law & Social Inquiry 34, 4 (2009), 
983-2015.  
6 A. Good, ‘Expert evidence in asylum and human rights appeals: An expert’s view’, 
International Journal of Refugee Law 16, 3 (2004), 358-380. 
7 J. Conley & W. O’Barr, ‘Hearing the hidden agenda: The ethnographic 
investigation of procedure’, Law & Contemporary Problems 51, 4 (1988), 181-197. 
8 J. Conley, J., W. O’Barr & E. Lind, ‘The power of language: presentational style in 





case in a wider social context to understand complex legal processes and the roles 
played by the state, lawyers, judges and defendants. 
In recent years, terrorist attacks have provided legislators with the authority to 
fundamentally reshape the quality of justice and the work of the law in Europe and 
North America. This is especially evident in the field of immigration where strategic 
concerns about national security and terrorism have been used to rewrite law, pass 
new legislation and reinforce the discretionary power of the executive in ways that 
would have been unthinkable before 9/11.9   
Quite apart from the use of counter-terrorism measures in colonial Kenya, 
Malaysia, and elsewhere, Britain has also used counter-terrorism legislation to ban 
individuals, prescribe organizations and criminalize behavior in Northern Ireland. 
This history has informed recent legislation10including The Terrorism Act (2000).11 
Indeed the Government continues to enact legislation aimed at enhancing the security 
of the UK including The Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005)12 (which introduced 
control orders), The Terrorism Act (2006)13 and well as laws which anticipate 
terrorist events such as the ‘Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Bill’ and the 
‘Draft Enhanced Terrorism and Investigation Measures Bill’.14 The latter measures 
are supposed to be a ‘less intrusive system of terrorism and prevention measures’ that 
‘will protect the public from individuals who pose a real terrorist threat’ but who 
cannot be prosecuted or, in the case of nationals suspected of terrorism, cannot be 
                                                 
9 See: E. Brouwer, ‘Immigration, asylum and terrorism: A changing dynamic. Legal 
and practical developments in the EU response to the terrorist attacks of 11.09”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law 4 (2003), 399-424; and E. Boyle & E. 
Busse, ‘Institutional vulnerability and opportunity” Immigration and America’s “War 
on Terror”, Law & Social Enquiry 31: 4 (2006), 947-74. 
10 See: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=terrorism 
11 See: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents  
12 See: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/contents  






deported.15 Viewed in their entirety, ‘counter-terrorism’ legislation has shifted from 
an attempt to investigate, criminalize and proscribe individuals/organizations 
operating in the UK to a preemptive, anticipatory attempt to prevent individuals from 
entering the UK whom the Government suspects may carry out terrorist-related acts.  
In what follows I do not offer a line-by-line reading of legislation nor do I 
look at the voluminous literature on terror-related litigation. Rather, I adopt an 
anthropological approach informed by an in-depth examination of the case of one 
individual who was detained under a control order for six years.16 This approach 
requires me to situate the case in a wider legal context to understand the role played 
by state institutions and key legal actors involved in counter-terrorism hearings. I also 
seek to understand whether legal procedures are ‘fair’, how the law affects a person 
held under a control order/‘TPIM notice’ and whether such measures contribute to 
the very thing they seek to prevent.17 
In most areas of law defendants and their legal representative know the case 
they will have to answer in court; this is not true in control order/TPIM cases because 
the ‘evidence’ relied upon by the Secretary for the Home Department (SSHD) is kept 
secret, i.e., it is not disclosed.  Furthermore, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
                                                 
15 See: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/legislation/tpim-bill/. 
16 The case method in the study of law is a well-known way of examining aspects of a 
single case from which it is possible to generalize to other cases; see: A.L. Epstein. 
‘The case method in the field of law’, in A.L. Epstein. Ed. The Craft of Social 
Anthropology (Tavistock: London. 1967), 205-230. 
17 In SSHD v AF (no. 3) [2009] UKHL 29, Lord Hoffman stated that there were 
‘strong policy considerations that support a rule that a trial procedure can never be fair 
if a party to it is kept in ignorance of the case against him’. He based his conclusion 
on two reasons. First, there will be many cases where it is impossible for the court to 
be confident that disclosure will make no difference. Second, if individuals are 
effectively placed under house arrest without being told the gist of the case against 
them, feelings of resentment will be felt not only by the controlee but also by his 
family, friends and broader community’ (my emphasis, cited in A. Kavanagh, ‘Special 





(2005)18 – which has been superseded by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act (2011)19 and the Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015)20 – the 
courts are prevented from adequately reviewing and, if necessary, quashing/setting 
aside a case and releasing the defendant.  
Given the clear temporal, legal and geographic shift reflected in recent 
terrorist legislation which seeks to anticipate and prevent offences before they are 
committed,21 it is useful to view this area of law as a hybrid politico-legal field 
characterized by its own blurred and chameleon-like processes which fuse together 
criminal law, immigration law and national security considerations. This situation has 
arisen because, in the face of an expanded perception of threat, legislators tell us that 
we need to re-calibrate the relation between liberty and security so that security 
concerns trump individual liberty.22 This rebalancing can be observed in the way that 
terrorist legislation increasingly ‘targets people on the basis of whom they know and 
associate with rather than what they have done’23 which reflects the growing extent 
to which politicians, rather than the courts, assess ‘risk’.  
Nowhere is this better seen than in the operation of ‘Closed Material 
Proceedings’ (CMP) or ‘secret trials’24 which individuals who are arrested and 
detained under counter terrorism laws are subjected to. Secret trials, which are 
                                                 
18 See: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/contents  
19 See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/contents/enacted  
20 See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted  
21 J. McCulloch, ‘Pre-Crime and counter-terrorism. Imagining a future crime in the 
War on Terror’, The British Jo. of Criminology 49, 5 (2009), 628-645 
22 L. Zedner, ‘Securing liberty in the face of terror: Reflections from Criminal 
Justice’, Jo. of Law & Society 32, 4 (2005), 507-533   
23 McCulloch, ‘Pre-Crime’, 628. 
24 CMPs operate in 21 different contexts which rely on special advocates to ensure 
that state evidence against a defendant is disclosed where they provide a ‘veneer of 
respectability’ to legal proceedings. See: J. Jackson, ‘The role of special advocates: 
Advocacy, due process and the adversarial tradition’, International Jo. of Evidence 




distinct from cases in which individuals are publicly tried in a criminal court, have 
serious implications for a defendant’s right to a fair trial including: (a) the right to be 
tried by an independent and impartial tribunal; (b) the right to have ones’ case 
defended on the basis of established facts and the law; and, (c) the right to know the 
case against you and the right to respond to that case in an open court.25   
Central to my task is the need to translate the ‘ideology’ of law – the language 
employed by lawyers, the courts and the Home Office (the government department 
responsible for immigration and passports, drugs policy, counter-terrorism and 
policing) – to reveal the underlying power relations at work. Secret trials need to be 
understood as an uneven contest whose outcome is influenced by many inter-related 
factors including: a rapidly changing legislative process; lobbying in Parliament and 
the House of Lords and efforts by the Home Office to create primary legislation (e.g., 
to reverse High Court decisions, pursue litigation, overturn policy or case law, and to 
allow the SSHD’s to use her executive power to issue new immigration rules and 
polices).26  
Secret trials involve actors/institutions which possess differential power and 
resources – the Home Office, police and prison officials, immigration officials, 
Special Advocates, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), the Court 
of Appeal and legally aided lawyers – whose work decides the fate of individuals 
accused of terrorism. Legal appeals against a control order/TPIM are not level 
politico-legal contests because the Home Office relies on its access to substantially 
                                                 
25 G. Hudson, n.d. “Behind Closed Doors: The judicial administration of ‘secret 
trials’ in Canada.” Paper presented at International Association for the Study of 
Forced Migration, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece, 24-27 July 2018.  
26 J. Campbell, Bureaucracy, Law and Dystopia in the United Kingdom’s Asylum 




greater ‘resources’ (including its use of the media) and its ability to rewrite ‘the rules 
of the game’ to up the ante and win judicial/political contests.27 
Regardless of the unevenness of the contest, lawyers and judges uphold an 
ideology of ‘the rule of law’ which can loosely be described as flowing from the 
principles of fairness, equality before the law and human dignity. This principle is 
actualized by an ‘independent judiciary’ which, in theory, has the right to scrutinize 
and interpret legislation and to review the decisions of lower courts and state 
officials.28 However, this ideology obscures what happens. 
Section (i) of this chapter provides a précis of the events leading up to Mr. 
O2’s29 appeal; it also sets out the restrictions imposed on him by the Home Office. I 
adopt the pseudonym of ‘O2’ to emphasize the fact that suspected terrorists provide 
the government with a rationale for its argument that enhanced security arrangements 
are required to protect the public (i.e., if there are no suspects, there is no oxygen/O2 
and, thus, no rationale for the law). I then briefly discuss my involvement in the case 
and my research methodology. Section (ii) examines at the High Court hearing of 
O2’s appeal against the control order. I focus on the tactics employed by the SSHD. 
Section (iii) looks at the role played by the judiciary who adjudicate control order 
appeals. Considering the extensive powers held by the SSHD, as revealed in the case 
of Mr. O2, I conclude that terrorist legislation has rebalanced the scales of justice in 
favor of security over individual liberty and that, by anthropological standards, the 
legal proceedings analyzed in this chapter are unfair.  
                                                 
27 F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils. A Social Anthropology of Politics (Schocken 
Books: N.Y. 1969). 
28 Lord Woolf, ‘The rule of law and a change in the constitution’, The Times, 3 
March 2004 at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article1036741.ece?  
29 To protect the identity of the defendant and his family I have stripped all personal 
information from the text and I have deleted reference material, including court 




Mr. O2 and the Secretary of State’s allegations 
O2 arrived in the UK with his family and claimed asylum in the early 1990s; in 1999 
he and his family were granted indefinite leave to remain which permitted them to 
settle in England. In late 2000, he began to attend mosque and in 2001 he converted 
from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. In mid-2004, 02 went on a camping trip with 
acquaintances and in 2005, together with a small group of friends, he traveled to 
Mogadishu, Somalia, to practice ‘dawah’.30  
While he was in Somalia members of his family were arrested in connection 
with a failed terrorist attack. However, rather than returning to the UK 02 went to 
Ethiopia where he remained with his Ethiopian wife until December 2006. On seeking 
to board a flight to the UK he was arrested, detained and interrogated by the Ethiopian 
authorities for two weeks. When he was released he flew to London in December 
2006 and was detained on arrival. The SSHD initially refused him entry into the UK 
‘on the grounds that his exclusion was conducive to the public good’ and she also 
cancelled his Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). He was arrested and questioned at 
Paddington Green Police Station, London, by the police and MI5 and four days later 
he was transferred to prison.  
Initially the Home Office objected to O2 being granted bail. In its ‘First Open 
Statement and Objection to Bail’31it argued that: (1) he was ‘an Islamic extremist who 
is strongly assessed to have attended a terrorist training camp in Cumbria’; (2) ‘he 
participated in terrorist training in Somalia’; and, (3) given his ‘links to an individual 
assessed to have attempted to carry out terrorist attacks in London, the Security 
                                                 
30 Da’wa or da’wah is a religious act/obligation imposed on Muslims. According to 
H. Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Arabic-English) (Otto 
Harassowitz: Wiesbaden. 1979, 365) da’wa means: to wither, wilt, fade; but also to 
spread, get about, circulate, be spread, be disseminated, be or become widespread … 
to propagate, make known etc.’ There does not appear to be a uniform expectation as 
to how a Muslim fulfills this obligation.  




Services assess that there is a real risk that O2 would become involved in attack 
planning in the UK’. The statement justified a refusal to disclose further information 
because ‘damage could be done by disclosure …[that] would cause real harm to the 
work of the Security Service’. The statement continued: ‘The general nature of those 
concerns need little elaboration. They are aimed at both protecting the integrity of 
security and intelligence operations and at protecting the safety and usefulness of 
those whose work for the Security Services and who provide information to it.’ As 
will become evident, the Home Office had little concrete information about O2, but its 
suspicions created an inordinate hurdle against which O2 and his legal team struggled 
to secure bail and to challenge the control order in his High Court and subsequent 
appeals (when some of the allegations were withdrawn). 
Nevertheless, O2 was eventually granted bail on stringent conditions (though 
he was not released from prison until July because secure accommodation could not 
be found where he could be monitored by the police). In July 2007 his brother-in-law 
was convicted of involvement in a failed terrorist attack. In August, the SSHD 
obtained permission to make a control order32 for O2 (see Box A, below). At this 
point, the SSHD re-instated his ILR and withdrew her decision to remove him from 
the UK.  
In April 2008 O2’s control order was suddenly modified, and more stringent 
conditions were imposed on him including a requirement that he move 150 miles 
away from his community and family. While waiting for his appeal, four siblings 
were charged and convicted under sec. 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 of failing to 
inform the police about a possible attack and/or assisting an offender to evade 
                                                 
32 For a list of all the restrictions that the SSHD can impose see A. Carlisle (Lord), 
Fourth Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant to Sec. 14(3) of the Prevention 




capture.33 In early July his appeal against the imposition of the control order was 
heard at the Royal Courts of Justice, London.  
 
Insert Box A here 
 
My involvement in this case 
In early 2007 I was interviewing an immigration case worker as part of a research 
project aimed at mapping and analyzing the British asylum system.34 During the 
course of the interview, I was asked whether, as a recognized ‘country expert,35 I 
would be willing to assist a client of the firm who was detained in a high security 
prison under a terrorist control order.  
I agreed to assist and was instructed by the firm to help them understand the 
circumstances of his detention and treatment by the Ethiopian authorities (which the 
Home Office had not disclosed information about) and to write an expert report for 
his hearing at the High Court. I was given access to all correspondence about the case 
including: legal representations, correspondence with the Home Office, the 
appellant’s asylum application, ten witness statements made by the appellant and 
material about the criminal trial against members of his family. I also attended the 
‘open sections’ of O2’s appeal at which I took verbatim notes of everything that was 
said during the proceedings. Later I was given a copy of the official transcript of the 
open sections of 02’s appeal which enabled me to cross check my notes. I used my 
notes and the transcript to undertake a detailed analysis of the way that both legal 
                                                 
33 This law was not used at the height of Irish Republican terrorism in the UK. 
34 Research was funded by a grant from the UK Economic & Social Research Council 
entitled “Refugees and the Law: An ethnography of the British asylum system” (RES-
062-23-0296). I am indebted to O2 and his legal team for allowing me to follow his 
case and for giving me access to the transcript of the trial. 




counsels questioned witnesses and how witnesses and the defendant answered 
questions during the hearing. It is this analysis which forms the basis of the chapter. 
In July 2008, at the High Court, I was briefly introduced to O2 (this was the only time 
we met). Near the end of the appeal I was asked to write a second expert report 
addressing the Special Advocates ‘gist’ of information which summarized the 
evidence that was relied upon in the closed hearing against O2. Finally, I attended 
O2’s first appeal at the English Court of Appeal against the decision by the Home 
Office to alter his bail/control order conditions. From this point onward, I followed 
the case from a growing distance as his subsequent appeals were handled by different 
legal teams.  
O2’s High Court Appeal, July 2008 
Terrorist legislation limits the power of the court to decide whether the SSHD’s 
decision to impose a control order is lawful.36 This means that the court only has the 
power to ‘review’ the SSHDs decision to impose a control order to see whether her 
decision was ‘reasonable’ in its assessment of his involvement in ‘terrorist-related 
activity’ and whether the SSHD’s order was properly made ‘to protect the public from 
a risk of terrorism’. The standard of proof which the court applies is ‘reasonable 
suspicion’.37 This very low standard of proof is also used to impose ‘anti-social 
                                                 
36 See the PTA (2005), parts 2, 3, 7 and 10. 
37 For example, ‘A police officer has "reasonable suspicion" when there exists 
articulable facts or circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to suspect 
that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed. At this stage, police may detain 
the suspect for a brief period and perform a frisk ... Refusing a search does not create 
reasonable suspicion, although acting nervous and answering questions inconsistently 
can. For this reason, it is best not to answer questions if you have to lie in order to do 
so ... As a general rule, reasonable suspicion applies to situations where police have 






behavior order’ (ASBO)38 against a nuisance neighbor or to assess whether an 
individual has ‘breached the peace’ (a civil offence); it requires the court to assess 
whether the individual poses a future risk to the public. In short, the decision to 
impose a control order must anticipate whether an individual is likely to pose a threat 
to national security. If the court decides that the SSHDs decision was unreasonable it 
may quash the order; but the SSHD can reimpose it.39  
The procedural and evidential rules40 which operate in control order hearings 
differ substantially from criminal and civil proceedings. In the latter two systems the 
parties to a hearing are on an equal footing and procedures are in place to ensure that 
the case is dealt with fairly. However, in CMP hearings the court has a duty to ensure 
that information about the case is not disclosed to the appellant and his legal team if it 
‘is contrary to the public interest’, i.e., if such information might ‘harm’ the work of 
the security services that provide the information.  
There are serious questions about the ‘mosaic’ nature and reliability of the 
undisclosed information41 relied on in the closed section of CMP’s because it is not 
‘tested’ in open court. To deal with this problem, ‘Special Advocates’ (SAs) were 
created. These are government-vetted barristers whose role is to safeguard the human 
rights of the accused. As Jackson42 has argued, SA’s operate in a structurally difficult 
position: (1) they can make submissions to the Commission (SIAC) in proceedings 
which the appellant and his representatives are excluded from; (2) in theory they cross 
examine witnesses in CMP; and, (c) they can make written submissions to the judge. 
                                                 
38 A relatively new offence, see: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/anti-social-
behaviour/penalties/anti-social-behaviour-orders/. 
39 PTA sec. 3 (12-14). 
40 See: Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 1034, ‘The Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (Procedure) Rules, 2003, at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/20031034.htm. 
41 Interview with Ian McDonald, barrister at Garden Court Chambers (and former 
Special Advocate) on 27 November 2007. 




However (d), SA’s do not formally ‘act’ for the accused nor can the accused person 
appoint their own SA. Furthermore, ‘[w]hat is unprecedented ... is the prohibition on 
any communication between the special advocate and the appellant once the Special 
Advocate is given sight of the closed material’.43 In short, once a hearing is about to 
begin all contact between the SA, the defendant and his lawyer ends.  
SAs are supposed to ‘test the cogency’ of undisclosed material submitted in 
the closed sections of the hearing to see if it can be disclosed to the appellant without 
jeopardizing national security. If the court agrees to their request a ‘gist’ or ‘essence 
of the case’ is released to allow a defendant to respond.44 However the SA’s ability to 
perform this role is sharply circumscribed by their structural position.45 SA’s are also 
supposed to assist the appellant by advising on the best possible course of action in 
view of all the evidence. However, the appellant is not obliged to take their advice. 
There are, therefore, serious questions about the ability of the SA to perform this dual 
role.46 
Before turning to O2’s appeal it is important to observe how his five-day 
appeal hearing was organized. The appeal began at 10:30 am on a Monday; there was 
an hour lunch break at about 1 pm; afternoon sessions concluded no later than 5:00 
                                                 
43 Jackson, ‘The role’, 353. 
44 This is referred to as the SA’s disclosure role as opposed to his representational 
role. The state’s evidence is based on intelligence which takes a ‘mosaic quality’ 
because it is pieced together from various sources including intercept evidence, 
covert surveillance, agent reports and material taken from the internet. See: A. 
Kavanagh, ‘Special advocates, control orders and the right to know’, The Modern 
Law Review 73, 5 (2010), 841-842. 
45 In 2004 the role of SA’s was sharply criticized because of problems with closed 
evidence which emerged by accident. The incident led to the resignation of two SAs 
– one of whom was Ian McDonald – and a Parliamentary enquiry into the operation 
of SIAC and the use of SAs. See: House of Commons. The operation of the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates 
(Constitutional Affairs Committee. Seventh Report of Session 2004-05. Vol. 1. 
Report together with formal minutes). 2005.  
46 See House of Lords (SSHD v MB [2007] EWHC 651 (Admin) on this issue; and A. 
Sandell, ‘Liberty, fairness and the UK control order cases: two steps backward, two 




pm. As Box B indicates, the duty placed on the court not to disclose information 
submitted by the Government means that at least half of the entire hearing was held in 
closed session from which O2 and his legal team were excluded.  
 
Insert Box B here 
 
In examining O2’s appeal I focus on key aspects of the case including the 
power of the SSHD to litigate and orchestrate the appeal in a manner which enhances 
her power. Clearly, the key task confronting O2’s counsel47 was to discover the basis 
of the SSHDs case against his client. However, when proceedings opened on Monday 
morning O2’s counsel was forced to make an application in relation to two reports that 
had been faxed to O2’ solicitor late on the preceding Friday. The first report was a 
police ‘interview’ with O2 that occurred at the police station where he was required to 
report on a weekly basis. The interview – in effect a casual conversation – was in the 
form of a typed summary to which was attached a ‘risk assessment’. The assessment 
stated: ‘After careful consideration I would consider O2 High Risk of causing Serious 
Harm.’  
His counsel objected to the submission of both reports on the grounds that the 
information was obtained by deception, that it was served late, that experts were 
unable to examine and comment on it and that counsel had not been able to take 
instructions from O2 about the interview. The exchange between O2’s counsel (X) and 
counsel for the SSHD (Y) sets out the issues involved:  
                                                 
47 In England and Wales, counsel for the defense is normally composed of the 
instructing solicitor (she interviews her client, takes his evidence, prepares his 
statements and takes his instructions) who in turn ‘instructs’ a barrister. It is the 
barrister’s job to advocate on behalf of his/her client before the court (by taking him 
and his witnesses through their written evidence, cross-examining prosecution 




X: I ask that it [the report and assessment] be excluded. My position is that O2 
has nothing to hide. He has provided eight statements and has indicated his 
willingness to give oral evidence. The evidence should be adduced fairly. 
 
Y: One task of the Home Office is in relation to a consideration of the 
evidence to support the individual and whether it will undermine the case … 
The process may produce evidence that may help the Secretary of State […] 
that information must be disclosed. [In relation to notes of the interview:] The 
only challenge could be that they are inaccurate or that disclosure is late […] 
The risk assessment is of a different nature. But given that risk assessment is 
what the court does, it is important for the court to consider it... It would be 
inappropriate to rule it out on grounds of evidence. 
 
X: [ …] There are no provisions for this document. Its circumstances are 
wholly unfair […] It causes us prejudice…’ 
 
The judge read both documents and, following a submission in closed session, 
ruled the following day that:  
There is no general principle of English law that in civil proceedings …that 
evidence obtained by a trick must be excluded to the extent that the 
admissibility of such evidence involves the exercise of discretion. 
I propose to admit the notes of interview in evidence […] but the weight 
which should be attached to it will of course have to reflect the circumstances 
of how he came to be interviewed […]. As to the risk assessment, I believe I 
should only take it into account […] if the officer who wrote it is made 
available for questioning […] 
 
At this point Counsel for the SSHD stated that he would not call the police 
officer to give evidence (this appeared to me to be an attempt by the SSHD to 
frustrate the appeal).  
The Monday session resumed with counsel for the SSHD (Y) addressing the 
judge about the nature of control order hearings (it was the first control order hearing 
that the judge had presided over).  At 11: 27 counsel for the SSHD summarized the 
‘open’ evidence against O2. At 12:12 pm a Home Office official was called to give 
evidence regarding why the SSHD changed the restrictions imposed on O2 and why 
they refused to vary the restrictions. An hour lunch was followed by a two-hour 
afternoon session at which ‘Witness T’ – a member of the security services – gave 




The ability of O2’s counsel to cross examine ‘T’ was constrained by what the 
witness was willing to say in open court. However, it soon became clear that his 
answers, indeed, his willingness to provide information, were shaped by his view of 
O2. Cross-examination revealed that the witness was, if not hostile, then certainly 
antagonistic towards O2. Indeed, he refused to comment on a range of questions: (a) 
on the grounds that the information could not be disclosed; (b) because he assumed 
that, if relevant legislation had been enacted, that 02 would have been subject to a 
criminal conviction48; and (c) sometimes he did not know the answer (but rather than 
say this, he refused to comment and had to be specifically asked the reason why he 
refused to answer).  
On Tuesday it emerged that the Security Services’ contention was that O2 
‘may have had a general idea’ about the failed attack ‘but we accept that he may not 
have known specifics’. Even so because of the ‘extremist company’ he kept it was 
proper that the SSHD should make him the subject of a non-derogating49control order. 
Because the SSHD had refused to disclose whether it was her case that O2 had 
participated in terrorist training in Somalia, O2’s counsel anticipated this allegation 
and had asked that the SSHD to issue a visa for O2’s wife and brother-in-law to travel 
to the UK from Ethiopia to give evidence. However, the SSHD refused to issue them 
visas which ‘blocked the entry of potentially significant witnesses’. Counsel for the 
SSHD belatedly conceded that O2 was not alleged to have taken part in terrorist 
training in Ethiopia.  
                                                 
48 It is important to note that some of the actions attributed to the defendant, and 
explored during the appeal, were not illegal at the time. 
49 The PTA ‘creates two types of control order. The first is compatible with Art. 5 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and can be made by the Secretary of 
State; this is called a non-derogating control order. The second type is not compatible 
with Art. 5 and has to be made by a court on an application by the Secretary of State; 
this is called a derogating control order’ (Sec. 1 of the PTA 2005). The conditions 





From Tuesday afternoon through to late Thursday, the court heard evidence in 
closed session. Open session resumed at 3:30 on Thursday to hear evidence from the 
first of two witnesses called by O2’s legal team. After being sworn in on a Koran, 
counsel for O2 took Witness A, who had been issued a summons requiring him to 
come to court, through his written statement. The witness – who had met O2 at a camp 
in England where the SSHD alleged that military training had occurred – was cross 
examined by counsel for the SSHD in a manner calculated to undermine his 
testimony. He was asked why he did not want to give evidence – the witness had been 
remanded in prison for 18 months on terrorist charges only to be acquitted – and was 
accused of covering up what had happened at the camp. This line of questioning led to 
a heated exchange in which the witness sought to refute allegations that he was a 
terrorist, only to be confronted by accusations that some of his ‘associates’ on the 
camping trip had, subsequently, been deported and/or arrested under terrorist 
legislation. 
Counsel for the Home Office (Q) questioned ‘Witness A’ about his 
‘associates’ and about what occurred on the trip:  
‘Q.  Did you hear anybody talking about extremist activities or extremist 
views?   
  
A.  You have to define what you mean.   
  
Q.  Well, let me ask this question: did you hear anybody talking about using 
violence or about the desirability of using violence?   
  
A.  No.   
  
Q. Sorry, I did not hear that?  
  
A.  No.   
 





A.  We all talk about jihad, but you have to understand what jihad is. If you 
want to say jihad is violence – you have to understand what jihad is and unless 
you want to explain or I'll explain what jihad is, as far as my knowledge is.   
  
Q.  Well, could you explain to his Lordship what you think jihad is?   
  
A.  Well, jihad50is a very simple term in Arab language. It just means to 
strive, so in other words you can strive to do many things. You can strive to 
make yourself a better person by being humble, you can strive to – jihadist’s 
strive in many ways, so if people want to try and put the spin on it jihad 
means holy war, it doesn't mean that at all, because I know that's what's been 
used in common parlance, that people say jihad is holy war. It's just not. Jihad 
is just a struggle and the greatest jihad is the struggle with yourself. That's one 
view of Islam.   
  
Q.  So can we take it that you would reject the idea of violent jihad?   
  
A.  Would I reject it? Well, I mean, it's a fact in Islam that it happens, so I 
can't reject it. It's a part of Islam, isn't it, so …    
  
Q.  Do you think it is right?   
  
A.  Do I think what is right?   
  
Q.  Violent jihad?   
  
A.  I think that what is written in Islam is right, according to the principles in 
Islam.  
  
Q.  Now, a number of the people who were at the camp in early May 2004 
went on to do violent things, did they not?   
  
A.  That is what I've heard, yes.   
  
Q.  Now that you know that, do you agree with what they did?   
  
A.  What, to try and kill innocent people?   
  
Q.  Yes.   
  
                                                 
50 The concept is not simple. The Encyclopedia of the Quran interprets jihad as 
‘struggle, or striving, but often understood both within the Muslim tradition and 
beyond it as warfare against infidels … The term jihad derives from the root j-h-d 
denoting effort, exhaustion, strain’. Because numerous verses or sura have been 
added to the Koran over time, the term has acquired a number of meanings. For 
example, it may also refer to (a) combat against one’s own desires and weaknesses, 
(b) perseverance in observing the religious law, (c) seeking religious knowledge, (d) 




A.  Of course I don't. 
  
Q.  Sorry.   
  
A.  Of course I don't.   
 
Q.  And then there are a number of people, of other people who were in the 
camp, who have now been convicted in relation to terrorist training, if I can 
put it broadly. That is right is [it] not?   
  
A.  What's right?   
  
Q.  That a number of other people who were on the camp have been convicted 
of terrorist training?   
  
A.  Yes, they have been convicted of terrorist training, yeah.   
  
Q.  Do you agree with that? Sorry, the providing of terrorist training?   
  
A.  No, of course I don't.   
  
Q.  But there are a lot of people at this camp who have subsequently gone on 
to do things that you disagree with, yes?   
  
A.  Yes.   
  
Q.  But you never heard or saw or suspected anything untoward during the 
whole of this weekend?   
  
A.  No, because nothing untoward happened and the fact of the matter is that 
nothing untoward happened. You know this very well, nothing untoward 
happened. You know this very well. You don't need to be trying to nudge 
nudge, wink wink, you know very well that nothing happened there, and you 
can tell the court that. You can be honest and upright and tell the court that 
nothing happened there because you know this; because the reason why you 
know this is because you've had intelligence reports because they were 
watching us, so you know nothing ever happened […]   
  
In fact, counsel for the SSHD was eliding several separate events together 




camping trip that O2 did not attend. The cross examination ended as it had begun, 
with an accusation which discredited the witness.51  
Thus, shortly after the above exchange counsel for the SSHD (Y) said:  
Y: Mr. B, I suggest to you that what you have been describing about the May 
2004 camp is an attempt to cover up what was happening there.  
  
Witness: Is that your suggestion?  
  
Y: Yes. What [do] you say to that?   
  
Witness: Well, this is what I say to that: this is your suggestion and your 
suggestion is based on nothing … because the facts of the matter are – and 
these are the facts which was explained in Woolwich Crown Court. These are 
the facts which are on record. Surveillance teams were watching us … They 
have photographic evidence of us, many, many CDs worth, which I have seen 
… So your suggestion is just that, a suggestion, because you wish to spin on 
something just for the benefit of yourself …’ 
  
The above exchanges were significant. First counsel deliberately sought to 
provoke the witness by bringing up the charges made against him under the PTA. 
This inflamed ‘A’ who became quite hostile and had the effect of eliciting statements 
which undermined the value of his testimony. Furthermore, many of counsel’s 
questions were general in nature and did not relate to specific events or to O2 which 
witness ‘A’ might reasonably have addressed. Indeed, counsel’s questions exploited 
popular stereotypes about Islam, e.g., jihad as ‘violent’ and as a justification ‘to try 
and kill innocent people’. Counsel for the SSHD did not seek to obtain new 
information to assist the court – he sought only to incriminate the witness and reduce 
the value of his testimony. This tactic was unnecessary because the low standard of 
proof meant that his testimony could easily be undermined by establishing a ‘link’ to 
individuals who had been charged with terrorist offences after the camping trip.  
                                                 
51 Clearly this type of proceeding is adversarial, as occurs in criminal proceedings, 
and reflects attempts by counsel for the SSHD to secure a conviction. However, since 
the SSHD relies on undisclosed, ‘secret’ evidence, it might well be asked whether 




Some information provided in the closed sessions was released on Friday 
morning in the form of a ‘gist’ (a note) which summarized the evidence Witness T 
had given. The one page ‘gist’ (summarized in Box C) relates to Home Office 
allegations about O2’s visit to Somalia. 
 
Insert box C here 
The disclosure led O2’s counsel to instruct me to write a second report 
addressing the ‘gist’. My seven-page report – which discussed the substantial flow of 
people/refugees moving across the Ethiopia-Somalia border and anthropological data 
about ethnicity, language and ‘racial’ differences between Somali’s and Ethiopians – 
was submitted to the court the following Monday.  
The proceedings on Friday morning involved a two-hour session in which 
Witness B, the wife of one of O2’s associates who had accompanied him on the trip to 
Somalia, gave evidence. Counsel for the SSHD questioned her about her husband, his 
behavior, his associates and why he had gone to Somalia. However, she said that her 
husband only told her he was going to Somalia the day before he left and that while 
she knew O2’s mother, she did not know him or his siblings. She was unable to 
provide much information. Counsel for O2 attempted to clarify her evidence but the 
only relevant facts which emerged from her testimony was that her husband was a 
devout Muslim and that he did not tell her about his friends, activities or the trip to 
Somalia. 
Friday afternoon was spent taking O2’s testimony. This began with his counsel 
taking him through key issues52 in his ten statements and ended with questioning him 
                                                 
52 The issues were: his last visit to Ethiopia; his visit to Mogadishu; the inability  of 
his family to visit him in northern England where he had been compelled to live 
because of the control order; his response to an amended statement by the SSHD and 




about the statements made in the ‘gist’ concerning his activities in Somalia which he 
sought to refute. During this two-hour period, O2 was repeatedly asked if he had been 
involved in any (para-)military training, which he denied; he clarified key issues and 
denied all the allegations made against him by the SSHD. 
I turn now to key issues which arose from counsel for the SSHD’s three-hour 
cross-examination of O2 on Friday afternoon. The cross examination consisted of 421 
questions and the answers they elicited. Six themes emerged from my analysis of this 
exchange of which the first (immigration controls in the Horn) and the last (O2’s 
departure from Somalia to Ethiopia) were unimportant (as defined by the small 
number of questions; fifteen and nine, respectively, and the fact they did not figure in 
judge’s subsequent decision).  
Questions are used to obtain evidence and, depending on the jurisdiction and 
the ability of the lawyer, they can be used to ‘control’ a witness by discursively 
compelling him to make an admission and incriminate himself.53 Questioning in the 
context of a court room reflects the power of the court over those who are called to 
give evidence; it is a means of control reserved for those with recognized legal 
authority.  
The first substantive issue pursued concerned O2’s ‘friends’. Counsel used 
interrogatives and declaratives – as opposed to open questions allowing the defendant 
                                                                                                                                            
relation to the SSHDs refusal to modify his control orders and recent amendments in a 
security service statement about him; issues in response to further open material 
served by the SSHD; finally, his response to the circumstances in which he had been 
informally interviewed by the police and his comments in the police report. 
53 S. Harris, ‘Question as mode of control in magistrate’s courts’, International 
Journal of the Sociology of Language 49 (1984, 10-f) notes that iinterrogative 
questions ‘may be built in such a way as to elicit certain preferred answers, and hence 
create difficulties for witnesses to disagree’. Such questions can only be answered by 
a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and they are used to elicit specific information from a witness 
to explain their behaviour. It is very difficult for defendants questioned in this way to 
introduce new topics or to redefine the questions they are asked. See also C. Briggs, 





to redefine the question or provide his own answer – to compel O2 to provide 
affirmative answers54 which ‘linked’ him to a number of ‘extremists’55 thereby 
underlining the ‘reasonableness’ of the SSHDs decision to impose a control order on 
him. 
Questioning also focused on the conviction of members of his family for 
terrorist-related offences (four questions), before turning to his alleged relationship 
with convicted ‘Islamic extremists’ (29 questions). Counsel used disjunctive 
questions56 in which O2 was asked about his relationship to individuals named in his 
witness statements. Among the issues addressed was O2’s presence at the house of 
‘M’ who had subsequently been convicted of terrorist-related offences. While O2 was 
able to explain his presence at M’s house, he was compelled to acknowledge that he 
had socialized with Muslims there. This admission was tied to hear-say evidence57 
from an undercover police officer who had attended similar meetings at M’s house, 
albeit not the meetings attended by O2, that ‘jihad’58 was a subject of discussion.  
                                                 
54 Harris, Questions as mode, 10-f. 
55 Including his brother-in-law who was later convicted of a terrorist offence. O2 hotly 
disputed’ ‘links’ to ‘Islamic extremists’ (including to individuals who were 
subsequently charged and convicted; some who were charged and acquitted; some 
who were excluded from the UK; and some whom he disputed that he had any link 
to).  
56 Disjunctive questions are those which can only be answered by a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
57 The basic rationale for the rule of excluding hearsay evidence concerns the need to 
assess the evidence to see ‘what, if any, weight can be given to a statement by a 
person whom the jury have not seen or heard and which has not been subject to any 
test of reliability by cross-examination’ (P. Murphy, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice. 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford. 2005, 2425). However, in closed material 
proceedings there are no rules of evidence other than excluding evidence obtained by 
torture. In O2’s 2010 appeal against his proposed deportation to Ethiopia, SIAC relied 
on evidence obtained by British security officials about conditions in Ethiopia’s 
secret detention centers where foreign nationals who had been subject to 
extraordinary rendition had been held SIAS concluded that O2’s rights would not be 
violated if he were returned to Ethiopia. 




The focus shifted to the 2004 camping trip (sixty-seven questions). O2 went on 
the trip at the suggestion of his brother-in-law and they took his six-year old nephew. 
Was it a social occasion, asked counsel? Was this an opportunity to make new 
friends? No, said O2, ‘it was an opportunity for me to go camping’. Apart from asking 
him about what occurred during the trip, the nature and tenor of the questions 
intimated that the campers had planned terrorist attacks and had undergone military 
training. Indeed, counsel’s questions were based on hearsay evidence which derived 
from the observations of off-duty police officers – in a report written two years after 
the incident59 – that some individuals at the camp were ‘punished’. Officers described 
seeing individuals ‘dressed identically in black outward-bound fatigue type clothing’ 
who were being shouted at by an ‘instructor or leader’ who ‘controlled the group’. 
The inference which counsel was asking the Judge to make was that ‘punishment’ of 
the kind described must have been ‘military’ training. 
The line of questioning switched to his marriage, his wife’s pregnancy 
(information about which he expressed little knowledge), his trip to Ethiopia in early 
2005 and his intention to return to Ethiopia for the birth of his son (one hundred forty-
two questions). It was here that Counsel questioned the circumstances surrounding 
O2’s decision to go to Somalia with friends rather than travel to Ethiopia to attend the 
birth of his son. Didn’t he realize how dangerous Somalia was? What was his role in 
planning the trip to Somalia? Counsel specifically asked him why he had not 
informed his family about his intention to travel to Somalia. Counsel began by asking 
O2 whether he perceived that the trip to Somalia might be ‘dangerous’, an assertion 
which O2 rejected. 
                                                 
59 The admission of hearsay evidence written up two years after the alleged incident 
would appear to violate the most basic rules of evidence which concern, in this 
instance, a serious lapse in time between the alleged incident and the writing of a 





Q: ‘You are going to be safe?   
  
A.  Yeah.   
  
Q.  So there was nothing to worry about from that point of view. So you could 
tell your mother and your family that you were going to go to Mogadishu, could 
you not?   
   A.  Are you talking about from the safety point of view or from them …  
  
Q.  From any point of view.  
 
A.  No, if they were going to prevent me, they'll prevent me from going.   
  
Q.  No, there was nothing to prevent you telling them that you were going to 
Mogadishu?   
  
A.  Except that they would tell me not to go, that's the only reason why I didn't 
tell them.   
  
Q.  But they could not have stopped you going?   
  
A.  No, they would have told me, look, go to Ethiopia. My mum, she would cry, 
you know what I'm saying, yeah: "look, I raised you up, your dad used to do 
this", start crying, you know what I'm saying. You understand? So because of 
that, yeah, I didn't want to tell them. If I told them they would have talked me 
out of it.  
  
Q.  Well, that would be because your mother was expecting you to go to 
Ethiopia.  
 
 A.  Yes, and never heard of me planning go to Somalia […]’    
  
There followed a brief discussion about another issue before counsel returned to 
his original line of questioning:  
Q. ‘So let us see if we can come back …  
  
A. So the reason why I mentioned Egypt to her, yeah, because previously she 
knew about Egypt.   
  
Q. Well, your mother's objection was that you were not going to Ethiopia and 
you were going to be going to somewhere else?   
  





Q. Well, her objection was, was it not, that you were not going to Ethiopia and 
that is where she thought you should be going. That's right, is it not?   
 
A. Yes.   
  
Q. And so it didn't really matter where the other place was, whether it was 
Egypt or Barbados or Somalia. That is right? You would get the same reaction 
from her.   
A. Yes.   
  
Q. So why did you not say to her, well, actually I am going to Somalia?   
  
A. No, because I'm going to go … like, because, you know, the Egypt thing, she 
knew that I considered it and stuff like that, yeah, and I told it was for only eight 
weeks, yeah, and, you know, it's a good opportunity for me to go, basically. I 
lied to her, you understand, yeah, and that's it. I made up my mind, that's what 
happened.’   
  
O2 conceded that he had lied to his mother and family about going to Somalia 
because he went on the spur of the moment. This admission was seized upon by 
counsel for the SSHD who argued that if the purpose of the trip was really for 
religious purposes, why ‘lie’ about it to his family?  
At various points counsel deliberately inflamed O2. While both parties were 
frustrated by their inability to pursue or answer questions, O2’s inability to provide 
clear answers and to provide independent corroboration to support his account 
undermined his evidence.  
The afternoon concluded with O2 being briefly re-examined by his counsel about 
the camping trip, planning the trip to Somalia and the views of his UK-based Somali 
friends who discounted any danger of visiting Mogadishu. O2’s counsel concluded 
with questions pertaining to his social isolation which arose from his forced relocation 
to northern England because of the modified control order.  
The work of the courts 
The procedural and evidential rules established in the PTA and related terrorist 




and they require the judge to assess open and closed evidence. Second, given the 
limited extent to which a Special Advocate can assist an appellant, the onus for 
ensuring that legal proceedings are conducted fairly falls on the judge who decides on 
the admissibility of all the evidence. This legislation bears the imprint of three 
decades of emergency/terrorist legislation aimed at suppressing terrorism in Northern 
Ireland by single judges (i.e., the ‘Diplock Courts’),60 a fact which must surely 
explain why the effectiveness of adversarial challenge during the open sessions is so 
ineffective. If my conclusion is correct, then adversarial challenge by the Special 
Advocate in the closed sessions must have been practically useless to 02. However, 
we will never know the effectiveness of the SA because the proceedings were closed 
(nor is there a published record) and the court only requires sufficient evidence to 
support the SSHD’s suspicion that O2 was associating with ‘terrorists’. 
In this type of case the Judge must assess whether the SSHD has reasonable 
grounds for suspecting (‘believing’ in the case of TPIMs) whether the defendant has 
been involved in terrorist-related activity (which is not even a balance of probabilities 
test)61 and whether s/he is likely to pose a threat to national security. This assessment 
works by establishing ‘links’ between a defendant and ‘terrorists’. 
                                                 
60 B. Dickson, ‘Northern Ireland emergency legislation – the wrong medicine?’, 
Public Law (Winter, 1992) 592-624. 
61 In Re B [2008] UKHL 35) Lord Hoffman answered the question of how to decide a 
case on the balance of probabilities using a mathematical analogy:  "If a legal rule 
requires a fact to be proved (a 'fact in issue'), a judge or jury must decide whether or 
not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law 
operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either 
happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule 
that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the 
burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as 
not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is 
treated as having happened." At: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-500-
6576?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1. 
This is a civil, not a criminal, standard of evidence, which means that more than 50 




In a thirty-six-page decision, the judge made it clear that in assessing the 
closed evidence he required the SSHD either to disclose certain evidence or withdraw 
it (the SSHD decided not to disclose). He accepted evidence obtained by a trick and 
all the hearsay evidence as providing a sufficient reason to be skeptical of O2 and of 
witness A’s testimony. Skepticism was, he thought, justified because some of the 
individuals at the events attended by O2 had subsequently been convicted of terrorist-
related activities while others had been excluded from the UK. The judge argued that 
‘there are a number of reasons to be very skeptical’ about O2’s account of the trip to 
Somalia and the groups stated intention of doing ‘free-style dawah’ because Somalia 
was not a safe place to go.  
Critically O2’s ‘reticence with his family’ about going to Somalia led the judge 
to conclude: ‘One is entitled to suspect that he concealed the fact that he was going to 
Somalia in order to hide what he was really intending to do there […] the justifiable 
suspicion arises that what he was hiding was the jihadist training which he went to 
Somalia for.’ Furthermore, the absence of any independent evidence concerning his 
visit to Somalia was damning: ‘… (T)he fact that he was able to provide a general 
description of some of the mosques in Mogadishu does not mean that he stayed in 
them. He could just as easily have visited them to pray while he was in Mogadishu 
undergoing terrorist training.’  
In relation to his ‘links with Islamic extremists, the judge noted that: ‘This is 
not so much a case of guilt by association. Rather his connection with so many people 
associated with extremism makes it much more difficult to treat what might otherwise 
be normal activities, such as going on a camping trip, as innocent.’ The judge 
concluded, 
The many parts of the jigsaw to which the analysis […] above relates have 




underlying the control order, namely that the evidence (at any rate the open 
evidence) does not justify charges relating to any particular criminal activity 
being laid against O2. Any terrorist training which the evidence suggests he 
would have undergone took place before terrorist training was criminalized. 
But each of the core features of the Secretary of State's case raises suspicions 
in themselves to a greater or lesser degree, and when combined together they 
serve to increase one's misgivings about him. Everyone agrees on the 
importance of considering both the open and the closed materials together 
since the latter may have the effect of making the open case less strong than 
might appear at first sight. But even if such parts of the closed materials as 
might be regarded as exculpatory are taken into account, I have concluded that 
the facts relied upon by the Secretary of State in the open materials [...] 
amount to reasonable grounds for suspecting that O2 has been involved in 
terrorism-related activity, as defined in sections 1(1)–1(4) of the Terrorist Act 
2000 and section 1(9) of the 2005 Act.’ [my emphasis]. 
O2’s counsel appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal where it 
was heard in the spring of 2009. It took the Lord Justices less than 30 minutes to 
dispose of the appeal. Lord Justice W concluded that it could be seen from the 
determination that ‘the judge was putting all the matters together to see if the facts 
corresponded with the assumptions of the control order that there was a suspicion of 
evidence of terror related activities’. In relation to the apparent contradiction between 
the evidence of Witness T and my expert report dealing with the ‘gisted’/disclosed 
information, the Lord Justices noted that the judge had ‘considered’ both reports so 
‘what has he [the judge] done wrong?’ They allowed an appeal solely on the basis that 
O2’s human rights may have been violated when he was relocated to northern 
England.62The hearing bore all the marks of a ‘ritual’ in the sense that the Lord 
Justices, the legal teams for both sides and the SA went through the formality of an 
appeal knowing that the PTA made it impossible to defend an individual against 
‘reasonable suspicion’ of involvement in terrorist related acts.  
In early 2010 the SSHD sought to deport O2 – who had by this time, and out of 
frustration with being internally exiled, been convicted and prisoned for breaching his 
control order – to Ethiopia. The SSHD sought to deport him using a newly negotiated 
                                                 




‘Memorandum of Understanding’.63 Her decision triggered an appeal which focused 
on O2’s rights under the European Convention of Human Rights. The Court decided 
that it was satisfied with the diplomatic assurances that O2 ‘will not be subjected to 
treatment’ contrary to the ECHR and that the British Government would not be in 
breach of its obligations under the ECHR. However, O2 remained in prison until 2013 
at which time, to end his indefinite incarceration, he asked to be deported.  
Conclusion 
The PTA and associated legislation has given rise to a growing number of appeals 
challenging the use of secret evidence all of which highlight the courts limited power 
to review the SSHD’s decisions on control orders. While it has long been known that 
the decisions made in closed proceedings are subject to ‘extra-ordinary weaknesses’,64 
the British courts have shown a surprising reluctance to find fault with terrorist 
legislation.65 It was not until February 2009 when the European Court of Human 
Rights decided ‘A and Others v The United Kingdom’66 – a case involving 11 
individuals held under control orders – that the British courts were forced to rescind 
                                                 
63 Regardless of the fact that Ethiopia had a very poor human rights record, see: 
‘Letter to the British Foreign Secretary regarding diplomatic assurances (on Ethiopia)’ 
(17/9/2009) at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/17/letter-british-foreign-secretary-
ethiopian-deportation-cases 
64 G. Van Harten, ‘Weakness of adjudication in the face of secret evidence’, 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof 13 (2009), 3. 
65 For a review of a case similar to that of O2, see ‘R (AN) v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2009] EWHC 1921 (Admin), judgment of 28 July 2009’. For a broader 
review of SIAC procedures see House of Lords ‘RB (Algeria) (FC) and another 
(Appellants v SSHD (Respondent), OO (Jordan) (Original Respondent and Cross-
appellant) v SSHD (Original Appellant and Cross respondent) 2009 [UKHL] 10, 
judgment on 18 February 2009].  
66 See ¶220 and passim of http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/ecthr-and-
others-v-united-kingdom-application-no-345505-19-february-2009. This case, which 
involved the lengthy deprivation of liberty, required the SSHD to disclose a core 
irreducible minimum of the case against a defendant to give meaningful instructions 
to the SA. The decision saw the SSHD withdraw some control orders rather than 




earlier decisions upholding the procedural fairness of hearings which relied on closed 
evidence.67 
While the ECHRs ruling forced the SSHD to rethink her policy on the use of 
secret evidence68 it did not affect O2 because in his case the court had relied on open 
material to reach a decision. Even so, reliance on disclosed evidence in the form of a 
‘gist’ is very difficult for appellants to respond to because it requires independent 
corroborative evidence about events which, by their very nature, are difficult to obtain 
independent corroboration for. Furthermore, individuals held under a control 
order/TPIM are barred from seeing their friends and associates, and the latter are 
naturally reluctant to associate with the individual or provide evidence (as was the 
case with Witness A). 
The Terrorism Prevention & Investigations Measures Act (2011) and 
associated legislation69is much more pre-emptive in nature than earlier counter-terror 
                                                 
67 It is instructive to compare the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach to the use of 
the Art 1F ‘exclusion clause’ which, until 2013, relied upon similar reasoning to that 
applied in the British courts with respect to terrorism, namely that a person found to 
be ‘complicit’ in a crime could be excluded from Protection. In Ezokola v Canada 
[2013] 2 S.C.R the Supreme Court overturned the existing test and replaced ‘the 
personal and knowing participation test’ with a ‘contribution-based approached to 
complicity.’ It is now necessary to establish a voluntary, significant and knowing 
contribution to the organization’s crime or criminal purpose. Guilt by association is 
no longer enough to exclude an individual from the protection of the Refugee 
Convention (though a low evidentiary standard is used in Canada than in the UK). 
See: L. Waldeman & W S. Meighen. ‘An Analysis of post-Ezokola and JS 
Jurisprudence on Exclusion’, in I. Atak & J. S. Simeon. Eds. The Criminalization of 
Migration. Context and Consequences (McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal. 
2018), 138-167. 
68 See: ‘Home Secretary orders review of control orders for terror suspects’ (The 
Guardian, 16 September 2009), and ‘Terror suspect freed from control order’ (The 
Independent, 24 September 2009).  
69 Specifically the ‘Justice and Security Bill HL (2012-13)’ (which provides for closed 
material procedures in certain civil proceedings and prevents the court from 
disclosing sensitive information), the ‘Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Bill (Cm 8166) currently before Parliament (which would 
allow the SSHD to impose more stringent restrictions on individuals served with a 
TPIM notice) and the ‘Human Rights 1998 (Repeal and Substitution Bill) 2011-12’ 




legislation in that it builds on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) by 
extending ‘coercive non-trial-based measures aimed at terrorist suspects generally, but 
particularly at persons who have gone abroad to support ISIS or who may seek to do 
so’ by creating ‘Temporary Exclusion Orders’ (TEOs). TEO’s are used by the SSHD 
to prevent British nationals from entering the UK for up to two years (a form of 
enforced exile) while the individual is investigated. The bill also introduced 
‘strengthened TPIM measures’.70 Whereas TPIM notices replaced control orders 
ostensibly with ‘a more focused and less intrusive system of terrorism prevention and 
investigation measures’ (so called ‘light-touch measures’), ‘enhanced TPIMs’ rely on 
CMPs, SAs and the right to impose conditions which mirror the measures imposed on 
O2. 
What does O2’s case allow us to infer about the potential impact of current 
counter-terrorist legislation? It is clear that the reforms have strengthened the power 
of the state over the rights of individuals. Notable omissions from the legislation 
include a refusal to end the state’s reliance on intercept ‘evidence’,71 continued 
reliance on Closed Material Proceedings72 (with their dependence on SA’s to ensure 
fairness in a context in which it is impossible to know if they have fulfilled their 
responsibility and in which the court has limited power to quash a control/TPIM 
                                                 
70 Whereas individuals with the right to abode in the UK can, eventually, be deported, 
citizens cannot be deported or stripped of their citizenship; a TEO allows the SSHD 
time to consider the case against a citizen suspected of terrorism. See: H. Fenwick, 
‘Responding to the ISIS threat: extending coercive non-trial-based measures in the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015’, International Review of Law, Computers 
and Technology 30, 3 (2016), 174-190. 
71 Intercept information is not allowed in criminal or civil proceedings but is the basis 
of accusations and findings in control order/TPIM cases. 
72 In the UK it appears that the courts, Parliament and citizens are more willing to 
accept the need for ‘secret trials’ than is the case elsewhere. What does this 
acceptance reveal about our society, our fear of others and the need to ensure our 




order), and a failure to amend/repeal other anti-terrorist laws such as Sec. 19 of the 
Terrorist Act (2000) which was used to convict O2’s family.  
The new laws do not restrict the power of the SSHD even though The 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation had proposed a scheme that would 
allow a court to lift restrictions against suspected individuals where ‘the Home 
Secretary had reasonable grounds to believe that a named individual is engaged in 
terrorist activity and, in the view of the Director of Public Prosecutions, a criminal 
investigation into that individual is therefore justified’.73 In short, the Home Secretary 
retains the power to impose and sustain measures similar to those O2 experienced.  
Given the impact of other legislation and a substantial blurring of boundaries 
between civil and criminal law, it should be clear that existing legislation undermines 
the right of individuals to defend themselves against a TPIM notice. Secret trials, with 
all they entail regarding the erosion of a right to a fair trial, are set to remain an 
important part of the way in which the government proceeds against individuals who 
are suspected, but about which little evidence exists, of involvement in terrorism. It 
should also be remembered that the government withdrew its key claim against O2 
that he knew about, and was therefore complicit in, planning a terrorist attack in 
London. At no point in the open evidence was the argument made, and sustained, that 
O2 contributed to planning or carrying out the attack. 
The SSHD has promised not to ‘park’ – i.e., fail to progress – cases for more 
than two years and to attend to the reports of the ‘Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation’ but, if the experience of the outgoing Reviewer, Lord Carlisle, was 
anything to go by, the Government finds it easy to ignore unpalatable comments about 
                                                 
73 Lord Macdonald, Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers (Command 




the impact of restrictions or the length of control order/TPIM notices (see Carlisle 
2009).74  
Were ‘O2’ able to comment, what might he say? First, he would complain 
about the many powers of the SSHD – e.g., the ease with which she can 
remove/reinstate his ILR, the ease with which his case was ‘parked’ and the 
consequent social isolation imposed on him and his family, etc. Second, he would 
draw our attention to the shortcomings of his appeals, notably his inability to know 
and answer the charges against him, the courts admission of evidence obtained by a 
trick, its acceptance of hearsay evidence and the fact that he was found ‘guilty by 
association’ with individuals which the SSHD deported or arrested. 
In relation to the supposedly reduced restrictions that could be imposed under 
a TPIM notice – i.e., replacement of curfews by ‘overnight residence requirements’, 
‘greater access’ to communications, greater freedom to associate, freedom to study 
and work, etc. – I suspect that O2 would see these as superficial changes for two 
reasons. First, once an individual is placed under a control order no one wishes to be 
associated with him/her.75 Secondly, the SSHD retains her power to impose 
‘enhanced’ restrictions. It seems clear that, from the point of view of suspected 
individuals placed under them, control orders/TPIM notice are intended to isolate and 
punish individuals who the SSHD believes – but about whose activities there is no 
clear evidence – may be involved in terrorism-related offences.76  
                                                 
74 At a speech at the Institute of Advanced Law in February 2008 Lord Carlisle 
referred to the role played by political parties in Parliament who were the force behind 
the ‘pragmatic incrementalism’ which was driving the expansion of terrorist 
legislation which served as an impediment to reviewing and consolidating legislation. 
75 As Cerie Bullivant discovered, see: http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/materials/control-orders-case-study-cerie-bullivant.pdf (accessed 11 
February 2011). Also see A. Carlisle, Fourth Report of the Independent Reviewer 
pursuant to Sec. 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. (February). 2009. 




To be sure O2’s views were evident to his lawyers and, to a more limited 
extent, to the judges – who are appointed to the Bench following a successful legal 
career – who presided over his many appeals. It should be clear, however, that by dint 
of their training lawyers and judges tasked with implementing counter-terrorist laws 
do not seem to encounter serious ethical difficulties with the roles they are asked to 
play in control order/TPIM cases, i.e., judging by their willingness to take either or 
both sides in these legal contests. After all, to appear in the High Court, the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court to argue or decide ‘terrorist’ cases represents the 
pinnacle of a lawyer’s career. If they experience discomfort with the CMP and the 
way in which terror suspects are detained, their frustrations take the form of arguing 
over ‘facts’ – based on the binary distinction between ‘proved’ and ‘disproved’ – 
rather than contesting the fairness of legal proceedings which are conducted 
professionally but which always uphold the SSHDs imposition of control 
orders/TPIM measures. To err on the safe side, which is to say assessing a case on the 
balance of probabilities, that an individual did ‘associate’ with ‘terrorists’ is not a 
problem for lawyers and judges. Advocacy is what lawyers are trained to do in an 
adversarial system where they act on behalf of their clients. The exception, of course, 
are Special Advocates who straddle their representational and disclosure roles; 
however, their ability to perform both roles cannot be assessed which transforms them 
into chameleons/shape shifters whose professional and ethical responsibilities are 
poorly defined. 
As an anthropologist there is little reason to be sanguine about Closed Material 
Proceedings because we are taught to see the world differently to lawyers. After 
having heard all the ‘open evidence’ it is not evident to me that O2 knew about the 
terrorist incident which resulted in his lengthy internal exile/detention and the 




that so little evidence was adduced in his appeal that it is not possible for me to 
unequivocally assign liability for his behavior or to understand whether the 
accusations made against him had a basis in fact. Unlike lawyers, it appears to me that 
the parameters used to define ‘the balance of probabilities’ to allocate liability for 
wrong-doing are vague and poorly defined; the legal approach relies on identifying 
potential ‘links’ between individuals who are said to associate together. 
Anthropologists would want to know more about what, if anything, occurred at 
suspected meetings and we would want independent corroboration to assess 
conflicting accounts. In short, we tend to question normative and accepted views 
about assumed behavior, etc.  
Equally important, anthropologists are taught to step back from specific 
disputes to see the wider picture. In the context of Closed Material Proceedings this 
means looking at the role played by powerful institutions and legal actors in 
organizing, managing and participating in chameleon like political-legal procedures. 
Furthermore, whereas in law the concept of causality is inseparable from individual 
responsibility, anthropologists believe that there are likely to be multiple factors77 
explaining (criminal) behavior which are not adequately addressed by a legal process 
that relies on conflicting, uncorroborated or secret evidence. For anthropologists, a 
‘fact’ cannot be understood as true or false. Facts take their meaning from a moral or 
social universe which the law, which seeks a simple yes or no to assign liability, is not 
set up to understand.  
                                                 
77 See, for instance: ‘Assimilation’s Failure, Terrorism’s rise’ (The New York Times, 6 
July 2011) which argues that an obsession with radicalisation misses the point about 
why ‘so many young people, who by all accounts are intelligent, articulate and 
integrated, come to find this violent, reactionary ideology so attractive.’ The writer 
identifies the source of the problem with the failure of ‘multiculturalism’ and the 
failure of government to engage directly with ethnic minorities as citizens (to which 
should be added the impact of racism and discrimination on young Black and ethnic 




In conclusion, anthropology and law operate with different mindsets, 
assumptions and paradigms such that anthropology – certainly this anthropologist – 
finds it difficult to have confidence in the ability of Closed Material Proceedings to 
achieve justice. As Nader has observed, anthropologists attempt to see through legal 
discourse and legal procedure to lay bare and question concepts such as ‘justice’ and 
the ‘rule of law’ which, in the case of Closed Material Proceedings against an alleged 
terrorist, reveals a process that is deeply worrying. If it is true to say that law seeks to 
use its power to enforce, reflect, constitute and legitimize dominant social and power 
relations, by contrast the role of anthropology is to unsettle, probe and question the 
certainties which underlay legal practice/procedure and forms of governance which 
appear to be profoundly unjust. 
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